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Arbitration of Right of Employee to Self-Expression
Harold D. Smith*
T HE CONFLICTING INTERESTS DEALT WITH BY ARBITRATION CASES SUM-
marized in this paper involve management's right to direct an
employee's behavior and the employee's right to retain control over
his behavior. Many arbitrators attempt to balance these interests on
the theory that (1) an individual's rights are modified to some extent
when he voluntarily accepts those responsibilities which accompany
his entering an employee relationship; and (2) a contractual right
to discharge for just cause, does not equip the employer with an
absolute right to direct the employee to do or not to do anything
which the employer feels would promote the goals of the enterprise.'
Early Arbitration and the Management Rights Doctrine
One type of individual interest that comes in conflict with the
employer's interest is the employee's right to change wearing attire
and hair styles as the social norms change. Standards as to what
constitutes unacceptable conduct or attire change with the times.
Not many years ago employees were subjected to rigid work rules
and contract restrictions with regard to personal appearance and
proper wearing apparel. For example, in the 1920's females were not
permitted to work in many plants if they wore their hair bobbed,
and in the 1930's some plants refused to allow women to work in
slacks.2
A female employee was disciplined in a 1956 case for persisting
in wearing a dress after being told to wear jeans. The arbitrator
overruled the discipline, since the posted rule requiring jeans had
not been enforced consistently but it was made clear that manage-
ment had the right to set standards for appropriate attire. In his
decsion Arbitrator Pearce Davis said the company has every right
to require all female employees to wear jeans for reasons of "decor-
um" "appropriate dress", or "ethics".3 It is interesting to note that
no mention was made of any requirement that the restrictions be
related to the job, which we will see as a requirement in later
decisions.4
*B.S., Kent State University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State University College
of Law; Employed by the General Electric Company, in Employee and Labor Relations.
1 Giles and Ransome Corp. v. Int'l. Operating Eng'rs. Local 542, 1 CCH 1970 Lab.
Arb. Awards § 8319 (May 16, 1969).
2 Mitchell-Bentley Corp., v. UAW Local 743, 1 CCH 1966 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8141
(Dec. 31, 1965).
a Lawrence Bros. Inc. v. United Steelworkers Local 1140, 28 Lab. Arb. 83 (1956).
4 Imco Container Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 1 CCH 1971 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8007
(May 22, 1970); Allied Employees Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1105, 55 Lab.
Arb. 1020 (1970); 4 BNA LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
203:331 (Supp. 216).
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In the 1950's it appeared that strict work rules were supported
by arbitrators on the basis of management's rights. In a 1954 case
involving "just cause" where a contract that failed to limit the em-
ployer's right to discharge, but expressly limited the grievance and
arbitration procedure, an arbitrator held that an employer had a
right to discharge with or without "just cause".5
In a book by Russell Smith, James C. Phelps of Bethlehem Steel
is quoted as follows:
When we speak of the term "management's rights"
we are referring to the residue of management's pre-existing
functions which remains after the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement. In the absence of such an agreement,
management has absolute discretion in the hiring, firing, and
the organization and direction of the working forces, subject
only to such limitations as may be imposed by law . . . In
general, the process of collective bargaining involves an
attempt by a labor union to persuade an employer to accept
limitations upon the exercise of certain of his previously un-
restricted managerial rights. To the extent that the union is
unsuccessful in persuading an employer to agree to a par-
ticular demand, management's rights remain unlimited.6
Russell Smith also points out that it is reasonably clear that the
United States Supreme Court has rejected the long standing reserved
rights doctrine in the case of United Steelworkers v. Worrier and Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). His reasoning was that the lower
courts in the Warrier decision, accepted the view that the reserved
rights doctrine can have only one meaning where there is silence in
a labor agreement, that is to give management unfettered discretion.
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that silence in
a labor contract may have more than one meaning. In other words,
when the Supreme Court ordered the parties to arbitrate, the court
by implication rejected the view that the lack of any explicit pro-
vision in the agreement covering subcontracting necessarily gave
management complete control over the matter.7
It is obvious from the 1950 cases that management was successful
in getting arbitrators to uphold its very strict rules regarding per-
sonal appearance under the management's rights doctrine. After the
Warrier decision, the 1960's saw a change in attitude on the part of
the arbitrators in the management's rights area.
Arbitrators began to water down management's right to establish
rules with regard to employee appearance, however it should be
noted that even with this change of attitude many arbitrators and
writers continued to emphasize the need for work rules in industry.
In a 1963 speech comparing the criminal law and industrial discipline
5 Okenite Co. v. IBEW Local B-1001, 22 Lab. Arb. 756 (1954).
6R. SMITH, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR ARBITRATION 307-08 (1970).
7 Id. at 311-12.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss2/17
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (2)
as sanctioning systems, Sanford Kadish told the National Academy
of Arbitrators that:
The general community, to the extent it is libertarian,
places a high value on personal freedom. It is committed to
a wide margin for non-conformity and to the maintenance of
fluid social conditions to allow individuals themselves to find
their own levels of preferred conduct and values. The ulti-
mate sanction of criminal punishment, because of its severity,
its moral stigma, and its overall compulsiveness, is therefore
thought inappropriate except to support the minimum social
conditions of order necessary to allow men to pursue their
own alternatives of fulfillment. In an industrial community,
on the other hand, the social values are imposed by the nature
of the enterprise-an efficient and profitable operation . . .
It is not and cannot be a wholly libertarian community; it is
a special purpose community with a job to do. Hence, the
very effectiveness of industrial punishment in coercing com-
pliance is not viewed as a limitation on its use so long as
the behavior regulated has justifiable relevance to the needs
of the enterprise. 8
In another speech before the National Academy of Arbitrators,
G. N. Alexander stated that management is entitled to cooperation
from its working force and should not be required to retain in its
employ persons who over a period of time demonstrate by their
conduct that they cannot conform to reasonable shop rules.9
Emerging Employees' Rights
In the 1960's, management turned its attention to beards, mus-
taches, sideburns, and long hair of the male employees. Management's
attempts to set standards in the area for its male employees resulted
in a marked increase in arbitration cases, particularly for those em-
ployees who dealt with the public.1 0
Another area where arbitrators were called upon to balance
interests between the employer's right to control employee behavior
and the employee's individual right to retain control of his behavior
was in the use of obscene language and the wearing of mod clothes
to work. It became obvious rather quickly that where dress codes
were involved, management was in a difficult position, particularly
when styles were changing radically. An arbitrator, in one of his
decisions, mentioned that the wife of a prominent senator had appear-
ed in a mini-skirt at a White House function when the invitation
prescribed floor-length gowns; he noted that it is apparent that
individuals are capable of extraordinarily strong convictions where
fashion is involved. The arbitrator also said that style trends would
find their way into the work place unless the employers establish
clear, and reasonable standards."
s Id. at 354.
I d. at 385.
0 4- BNA LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 203:331 (Supp. 216).
1 Canteen Corp. v. United Catering Local 1064, 52 Lab. Arb. 781 (1969).
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The middle 1960's showed a marked trend away from arbitrators'
support of management's right to discipline for hair styles and wear-
ing attire simply because they were unacceptable to management.
Arbitrators began to develop a set of criteria which management was
required to meet before discipline would be supported. In a 1965
decision it was held improper for a company to send two women
home for wearing short shorts. Discipline in this case was based on
a rule which prohibited reporting for work in unsuitable attire. The
arbitrator said that the Company had been so permissive on the
matter of shorts that it could object only if the shorts were indecent
or unsafe.12
Decisions in 1960 began to show an increase in union arguments
that employees have a "personal" right to wear certain styles of
clothing. Abritrator M. S. Ryder accepted this argument in the "short
shorts" case when he held that so long as they did not lend to in-
decency in appearance, female employees in a plant had a personal
right to wear short shorts while performing their assigned jobs. 13
In the early 1960 decisions, arbitrators had a tendency to favor
reinstatement of employees discharged for wearing long hair and
"mod" attire but only on condition that: (1) they abide by standards
prescribed by the arbitrators (2) or that they dress similar to the
way they appeared at the arbitration hearing. For example, a male
employee who was discharged for wearing boots, clinging orange-
brown pants with over-sized belt and buckle, and long-flowing hair-
cut was given a second chance after he showed up at an arbitration
hearing with a haircut and a manner of dress that in the arbitra-
tors words "presented the very epitome of the more mundane ac-
cepted norm befitting a manifest dispatching clerk in the shipping
industry."' 4 The reinstatement was conditioned on:
(a) that the grievant shall in all respects abstain, refrain
and desist from his former mode and manner of attire, hair
styling and general appearance during working hours and the
performance of his job duties; and (b) that the said grievant
shall at all times during work hours and the performance of
his job duties maintain and present the well-groomed ap-
pearance and mode of attire comparable and consistent with
that which he exhibited at the arbitration hearing as his in-
tended general work appearance and manner of attire in
the future. Failure of the grievant to abide by the terms and
conditions shall constitute a valid basis for his termination.14a
Later cases will show that arbitrators no longer set this type of
restrictions as basis for reinstatement.
12 Mitchell-Bentley Corp. v. UAW Local 743, 1 CCH 1966 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8141
(Dec. 31, 1965).
13 Id.
14 American Export-Isbrantsen Lines, Inc. v. Office Employees Local 153, 1 CCH 1967
Lab. Arb. Awards § 8052.
24& Id.
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Even though arbitrators began to be more cognizant of em-
ployees' personal rights in the 1960's, as late as 1967 arbitrators were
still emphasizing that employees had given up a certain amount of
personal rights when they accepted a job. For example, in a case
involving the Dravo Corporation, Arbitrator W. B. Wood held that
any personal liberty the grievants in that case might have had to
wear a beard was limited by certain restrictions which existed as
conditions of employment. He also emphasized that if the men be-
lieved the rule was improper, they should have obeyed it and taken
their protest through the grievance procedure.'5 This was the general
view of arbitrators prior to the late 1960's. In another 1967 decision
discharge was upheld for violating a plant rule requiring that hair
be neatly combed and conservatively styled. The grievant was a
grocery clerk and also a member of a rock and roll quintet. Arbitra-
tor David Johnson recognized the grievant's right to wear his hair
as he saw fit; however, the arbitrator said in that instance he chose
to wear his hair more in line with his career as a musician.16 The
rationale of course is that the grievant chose between two occupa-
tions when he refused to cut his hair in accordance with the grocery
store regulations. However, more recent cases indicate that arbitra-
tors are less inclined to insist that employees cut their hair first and
submit a grievance later.17
The latter part of the 1960's saw a further change in arbitrator's
attitudes. The age of the protestors began to hit industry near the
end of the 60's and in the early 70's. One might expect this new work
force to attempt to exercise more individual rights. In 1969 Arbitra-
tor M. David Keefe acknowledged the arrival of the new work force
when he said:
This is the age of the "protestors". Not only in our
American Society, but throughout the world, nations are con-
vulsed to varying degrees with the fever of fervent
"againsters"' 8
The 1960's showed us much unrest, including protests on college
campuses and demonstrations throughout many cities. There was
a marked increase in instances where individuals claimed constitu-
tional rights to demonstrate and protest. It is only logical that begin-
ning near the end of the 60's we saw an increase in employees in
industry demanding protection of their constitutional right to free
speech, the right to dress as they pleased and to wear the hair style
of their individual choice. The arbitrators were faced with many
new arguments claiming violations of constitutional and civil rights
in discipline cases.
15 Dravo Corp. v. Marine and Shipbuilding Workers Local 61, 1 CCH 1967 Lab. Arb.
Awards § 8293.
16 Stop and Shop Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 919, 1 CCH 1968 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8040
(Nov. 12, 1967).
" Dravo-Doyle Co. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 66, 54 Lab. Arb. 604 (1970).
Is Canteen Corp. v. United Catering Local 1064-, 52 Lab. Arb. 781, 789 (1969).
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Problems created by the "new work force" are expected to con-
tinue. According to a panel of union and management lawyers at the
annual meeting of the American Bar Association, a changing labor
force, with the accent on younger workers, will be an important part
of labor relations problems in the 70's. It was stressed that during
the 70's, persons below 33 years of age will constitute one-half of
the labor force.19
In a recent speech, a union spokesman claimed that one reason
for employees demanding more individual freedom is that some man-
ufacturers associations have told them that if they do not stand up
and fight for individual freedom they will become a tool of the
union.2 0 For whatever reason, it is obvious that employees are de-
manding protection of their individual rights and arbitrators are
faced with balancing these individual rights against management's
right to control employees' behavior.
Standards for Discipline
The rationale used by arbitrators in deciding cases involving
personal appearance and wearing apparel varies widely but it seems
clear that management's right to set standards is still recognized.
However, whether management will be upheld in disciplinary actions
in this area appears to depend on whether the standards meet the
arbitrators view of reasonableness.
In dealing with discipline for violation of dress and grooming
standards, arbitrators have made these points: 2'
1. The standard must be clear, unambiguous and consistently
enforced.
2. The standard must be reasonably related to a business need
of the company, although it is recognized that "business
need" includes the need to keep employees from being
distracted by outlandish or overly revealing attire.
3. The standard must be reasonably attuned to contemporary
mores and attitudes toward dress and grooming. As styles
change, the standard may have to change.
In a hair suit involving United Parcel Service, Arbitrator Leo
Kotin set the following standards:
1. Sideburns shall not extend beyond the bottom of the ear.
2. Sideburns shall be of a uniform width throughout their
length, shall be in a straight line perpendicular to the
horizontal plane of the head, and be well-trimmed so as
to avoid the appearance of being bushy.
3. Hair styles should be of such type as to avoid having any
part of the ear covered.
19 BNA, LAaOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK, 102-03 (1970).
20 Id. at 222-25.
21 4 BNA LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE, PERSONNEL MANACEMENT 203:331 (Supp. 216).
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4. Hair shall be kept neatly trimmed on the sides and in the
back and shall extend downward on the back of the head
no further than a line one-half inch above the collar. 22
Arbitrator Kotin's standards were upheld in the discharge of a
route salesman by Pepsi Cola General Bottlers, Inc., in May 1970.
Arbitrator Marlin Volz said the rule represents a middle ground
between the concern of the employer to protect and improve its
image with the public and the preference of the employee for self
expression and individuality. He went on to say that " . . . an em-
ployee who deals with the public and solicits sales has an added
responsibility of presenting a pleasing appearance". 2.3
The union in this case presented a novel argument in stating that
the grievant's hair style was in line with the "now" generation -
the company caters in its advertising to the. "now" generation. The
arbitrator's rationale was that the contract was silent on the ques-
tion of grooming, therefore, the primary question concerned the
reasonableness of the company's rules and regulations pertaining to
personal appearance. The arbitrator indicated that a good appearance
to the public was important to all employees where it involves im-
pression of customers. He said, "... the economic well-being of the
company is, of course, vital to the employees as well as to manage-
ment. '24 The decision in this case seems to point out that the em-
ployee gave up a certain amount of personal rights when he accepted
the job. The arbitrator apparently was concerned about how his ap-
pearance would affect other employees.
It should be noted that the Koten and Volz decisions involved
jobs where employees came in contact with the public. In a March
1970 decision Arbitrator Samuel Kromsby held a discharge to be im-
proper where the employee refused to shave his beard and to cut his
long hair in violation of a plant rule. The arbitrator said, application
of the rule to the grievant would be unreasonable since it appeared
that he worked in an area which was so isolated that any contact
with others was extremely rare. As a matter of fact the evidence
indicated that the grievant had not been subject to any complaint
or adverse criticism by any customer or fellow employee. The ar-
bitrator also held in this case that the grievant did not have to
comply first and then grieve later as the status quo between griev-
ants'. rights and the company's order could not be regained within
a reasonable time.25 In other words, it may take months to regrow
the long hair and beard. This is a departure from the usual rule that
an employee has to obey a reasonable order and file a grievance if
he believes the order to violate contractual provisions. One arbitrator
in 1970 went so far as to say that an employee is not required to
22 United Parcel Service v. Teamsters Local 396, 53 Lab. Arb. 126 (1969).
2 Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Brewery Local 20, 55 Lab. Arb. 663, 664 (1970)..
24 Id. at 666.
25 Dravo-Doyle. Co. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 66, 54 Lab. Arb. 604 (1970).."
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follow an order which he reasonably believes to expose him to undue
hazards or which is a direct invasion of his personal life unrelated
to the demands of his job. It was on this basis that he held an em-
ployee did not have to switch from sandals to safety shoes while
processing a grievance. 26
Arbitrators are consistent in upholding management's right to
make reasonable rules governing the appearance of its employees
when there is an extensive need to rely on public trust for business.
In a decision involving Western Airlines,27 Arbitrator Charles Steese
commented on the public association of long hair with irresponsibility.
He pointed out that most men involved in violence on T.V., have long
hair and/or beards. He said that a majority of the public has come
to associate long hair and beards with irresponsibility. He noted that
any competitive edge for airline companies involves service and
the appearance of its employees because fares and equipment are
the same or similar. He went on to say that to permit an appearance
of long hair and beards could be detrimental to the company and its
business.28
Safety and Product Quality as Factors
Arbitrators are also quick to uphold discipline where a safety
rule is involved. In a 1969 case Arbitrator William Bothwell held that
an employer was justified in refusing to allow an employee to work
until he complied with a supervisor's order to trim his beard. The
rule in question banned the wearing of loose fitting clothing or brace-
lets and necklaces or long unprotected hair while operating a machine.
The arbitrator said the rule was reasonably applied to beards as well
as to hair and it did not completely prohibit the wearing of beards.
The employee was not being unreasonably restrained in his conduct
or dress so long as there was a reasonable relation between what
is required and what is safe.29
Arbitrators will not support discipline based on a safety rule
when the rule is applied discriminatorily. In the case involving the
IMCO Container Company, Arbitrator Peter Florey held that maiage-
ment could contrive whatever rules it deemed necessary for safe
shop practices, but such rules had to be reasonable-not based on
someone's dislike of a certain mode of attire. In that case the plant
safety committee after noting the grievant was wearing sandals came
up with the requirement that employees working in his area had to
wear safety shoes. The rule for safety shoes was initiated allegedly
for the safety of employees who handled 230-pound drums. When the
rule was put into effect a long haired employee was wearing sandals
26 Imco Container Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 1 CCH 1971 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8007
(May 22, 1970).
27 Western Air Lines Inc. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Employees, 2 CCH 1969 Lab. Arb.
Awards § 8761.
28 Id.
29 Springday Co. v. United Rubber Workers Local 662, 53 Lab. Arb. 627 (1969).
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and another employee was wearing tennis shoes. Enforcement of
the rule was relaxed when the long haired employee agreed to wear
moccasins instead of sandals subsequent to a one-day suspension.
It became clear that there were no real safety reasons for initiating
the rule because moccasins provide no more safety than sandals.
Back pay was ordered for time lost by the suspension. 30
Another area where arbitrators balance the interests, involves
an employer's interest in product quality and the employee's interest
in personal appearances. In a proceeding involving the Kellogg Com-
pany, Arbitrator John Shearer held that under a plant rule barring
male employees from extending their sideburns below the ear lobe
or making them wider than the upper width, an employer engaged
in production of cereal products was justified in discharging a carton
glue operator who kept his sideburns at about one-fourth inch below
his ear lobe, since (1) the rule reflects employer's growing concern
for protection of its product against hair contamination rather than
intent to regulate employee's appearance, and (2) the contract does
not limit the right of the employer to formulate and enforce reason-
able rules for protection of the product quality. The arbitrator said
the prescribed length seems to represent a reasonable compromise
between sanitation consideration and personal preference.3 1
In cases involving personal appearances, arbitrators also put
heavy emphasis on the norms of the community where the company
is located. In a Pacific Gas and Electrical Company arbitration, the
company's rules with respect to sideburns, mustaches, goatees, Van
Dykes and most other hair styles were found to be unreasonable
even though the employees involved were servicemen and customer
service clerks. The reasoning of this case centered around the fact
that the work was performed in the San Francisco area. The arbi-
trator noted that San Francisco is known for its sophisticated popu-
lation. He pointed out that the company could not reasonably say
that the local citizens would be perturbed at the sight of muttonchop
sideburns, a neatly trimmed goatee or Van Dyke, or, a mustache.
The arbitrator felt that the only rule worth saving was the prohibi-
tion of full beards and mustaches extending below the mouth. He
said that this type of facial hair can tend to be objectionable. The
arbitrator indicated that in making personal appearance rules the
company must make a realistic assessment of the environment in
which it is located. It was not to unduly restrict employee's rights
to appear as they pleased.32
This decision is typical of the current trend of arbitration de-
cisions in the area of discipline involving employee attire and hair
30 Imco Container Co. v. Textile Workers Union, I CCH 1971 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8007
(May 22, 1970).
.i Kellogg Co. v. Grain Millers Local 2S2, 55 Lab. Arb. 84 (1970).
32 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. IBEW Local 1245, 2 CCH 1970 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8808.
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styles. Arbitrators are giving more consideration to individual rights
and the relationship of rules to the type of work and industry in-
volved. Heavy emphasis is also being put on community norms and
whether the job requires contact with the public. In addition, the
general trend is that while providing for the needs of the company,
rules concerning neatness today should reflect contemporary changes
in style.
In dealing with this case, Arbitrator William Eaton faced the
argument that the right of an individual to choose his own hair style
may be a constitutional right. Recognizing that Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric is not a governmental institution, and that constitutional rights
do not therefore apply to the company per se, the union nevertheless
suggested that the existence of such rights might have a bearing on
the reasonableness of the company rule at issue. The arbitrator said
the union all but answered its own contention in regard to its con-
stitutional rights analogy when it observed that Pacific Gas and
Electric was not a public agency. He went on to say that while the
quasi-public nature of a public utility might invite interesting spec-
ulation in the field of constitutional law, the ". . . Constitution has
not yet been amended or interpreted in a manner which would allow
this Arbitration Board to pursue the matter as framed in the dispute
involved in this case."' 3
Constitutional Arguments for Free Expression
In another 1970 case, a union argued that the grievant was dis-
charged in violation of his constitutional and civil rights of personal
expression and preference. Arbitrator Marlin Volz held that the
interest of employees in the individuality of their personal appear-
ance should be weighed and balanced in determining the reasonable-
nsss of the company's rules. However, he pointed out that where such
rules and regulations are reasonable,
".... an employee has no constitutional or other right to
defy or violate them except at his own risk. He may have a
constitutional right to self-expression but he has no con-
stitutional right to continued employment in clear violation
of reasonable company rules."3 4
In another case involving a constitutional rights argument, the
grievants contended that their discharge violated civil rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution of the United States and more particularly
the 14th amendment. The case involved an airline company with
the aribtrator commenting on the public's association of long hair
with irresponsibility. He pointed out that loss of business can mean
loss of jobs for other employees. He went on to say that:
Given an option I am sure that the framers of the Con-
stitution of the United States would agree that the right of
one employee to make a living should certainly take prece-
33 Id. at 5704.
34 Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Brewery Local 20, 55 Lab. Arb. 663, 666 (1970).
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dence over another employee's right to grow long hair and
a beard.35
In a case involving a supermarket where employees meet the
public, it was held that under a plant rule requiring employees to
have their hair groomed and arranged so that it would remain
securely in place and not be unduly conspicuous, the employer was
justified in discharging a male grocery clerk whose hair extended
below his collar. In answer to a civil rights argument the arbitrator
said:
The Tradewell rule requires that hair should not be
"unduly conspicuous", and this would apply to women as
well as to men. The Arbitrator feels, however, that long hair
on a man might be very conspicuous, while the same length
hair on a woman would not be. This is not sex discrimination
in the same sense that the term is used in The Civil Rights
Act of 1964. It is true that the company is applying the rule
somewhat differently to men than to women, but this does
not mean that the company has violated the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.36
It was pointed out in this decision that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 does not require males and females to look alike. The arbitra-
tor went on to say that he agreed with the union that the first and
fourteenth amendments guarantee the individual certain rights, but
he said these rights are not without restrictions. The grievant has
a right to wear his hair any length he wishes, but he does not have
a right to a job with the company if his hair length violates the
company rules.s6a
The constitutional rights argument was raised in a recent case
involving a government agency. In that case a probationary officer
for the City of San Francisco decided to put on his office wall a
poster depicting several recent "folk heroes" who had trouble with
the law. The officer claimed that the poster helped to break the ice
with the people he met on the job, but a superior felt that the poster
was unprofessional and in poor taste. When the employee refused
to remove the poster a suspension was imposed. The union contended
that the poster was a form of expression which falls within the pro-
tection of the first amendment, as applied to the states and their
subdivisions by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The union's sole argument was that the Probation Department's action
in suspending the grievant was a violation of his constitutional rights
of free speech. After reviewing court cases in the area of free speech,
the committee concluded that:
While government employers may restrict the rights of
free expression of their employees, such restrictions must be
shown to be necessary to the proper functioning of the em-
35 Western Airlines Inc. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Employees, 2 CCH 1969 Lab. Arb.
Awards § 8761 at 5568.
36 Allied Employees Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1105, 55 Lab. Arb. 1020, 1025 (1970).
USn Id. -"
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ployer and they must be clearly and narrowly drawn to speci-
fically indicate the prescribed conduct. In the present case
there were no well-defined restrictions on employees'
rights, as was indicated by the fact that the superior's motive
for imposing the suspension was because the displayed poster
was deemed "unprofessional" and "in poor taste." Neither
criterion was sufficiently well defined to meet the require-
ments set out above.3 7
It was concluded that the grievant's constitutional rights had
been violated and it was recommended that the employee be awarded
five days' backpay with interest.37a
Constitutional rights arguments can be raised successfully where
government action is involved, but it appears that the only benefit
in raising such arguments where a private employer is involved is
to prevail upon the arbitrator to consider them in deciding upon the
reasonableness of the employer's action.
Balancing Interests and Obscenity
Another area involving social change where the arbitrator is
called upon to balance the employer's interest in controlling the em-
ployee's behavior and the employee's interest in retaining control
over his own behavior involves the use of obscene expressions. While
cases in this area are fewer than in the area of personal appearance,
the evidence is strong that arbitrators are far less likely to expect
an employer to tolerate obscene expressions because of the effect
it has on other employees, the company's image, and the ability of
management to maintain the necessary control to operate a profitable
business.
In the "obscene sweatshirt" case,38 the union challenged the com-
pany's right to discipline for conduct off the premises and unrelated
to employment. In that case, the grievant showed up at a company-
owned recreation area to participate in a night ballgame. He was
wearing a sweatshirt with illuminated fluorescent white lettering
on a colored background. The words reproduced on both the front
and back of the sweatshirt immediately offended some of the on-
lookers which included employees and their wives and a number of
teenage children. In discussing the facts, Arbitrator Harry Dworkin
pointed out the extreme difficulty in attempting to establish standards
governing obscenity or in applying preconceived definitions to par-
ticular situations. He also pointed out that running through several
published works where the use of the English language was the
common theme, the meaning attributed to particular words varies
with the circumstances, the times and the intent sought to be con-
veyed. He went on to say without going so far as to conclude that
37 Adult Probation Dept. v. City Employees Local 400, 1 CCH 1971 Lab. Arb. Awards
§ 8037 at 3136 (Dec. 2, 1970).
37a Id.
38 Glass Containers Mfrs. Inst. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n., 53 Lab. Arb. 1266 (1969).
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss2/17
21 CLEVE. ST. L. R. (2)
the lettering on the grievant's sweatshirt was obscene per se, the
circumstances definitely made them so. The arbitrator said there may
be some merit to the argument that the grievant acted consistent
with his constitutional rights in wearing clothing in accordance with
his personal preference, however, the character of the grievant's be-
havior must be assessed in the context in which it occurred. The
setting was not the grievant's home or some isolated area where no
objection could be lodged against his somewhat unusual attire. The
place selected by the grievant for his exhibition was on grounds
wholly owned by the company. The arbitrator indicated that the
grievant's right to conduct himself as he saw fit did not give him a
license to impose his thoughts upon others by force. The arbitrator
held that on the basis of the provisions of the working agreement
and the plant rules, just cause was demonstrated in support of the
discharge, and that the Bill of Rights did not protect a violator
against the consequences of such an act.ssa
in a recent case involving the Canteen Corporation, 9 Arbitrator
M. David Keefe held that an employer was justified in discharging
an employee who, in response to the employer's improper and public
chastisement because of her dress, directed an obscene remark at the
employer's representative and stated later that she would do the
same thing again under similar circumstances. The arbitrator upheld
the discharge even though he was extremely critical of the way
management handled the discussions leading up to the remark and
even though, in his opinion, management provoked the incident. The
arbitrator made it quite clear in this case that there is a need for
the employer to retain a certain amount of control over its employees'
behavior.
Arbitrator Keefe indicated that the case was a clear indication
of the social tensions and unrest which effect the work force today.
He pointed out that the issue was much broader than an ordinary
problem of every day plant life. He said the issue involved the effect
of changing times and mores on in-plant relationships. In justifying
his holding in this case, he said:
Modern industrial society, out of which the standard of
individual personal living are created ... is of its very nature
and complexity, subject to shutdown and collapse unless the
individual, human contribution to the machine operation is
orderly, efficient and productive... (T) he total way of life in
which we are enmeshed and from which we cannot escape
without mass starvation and deprivation, to say nothing about
the awesome dangers of conquest from outside if we destroy
our internal capacity to maintain industrial leadership and
production capacity, demands that the production line be
maintained in an efficient continuous flow. The alternative
is disaster. The means of self preservation is cooperation. The
88a Id
3 Canteen Corp. v. United Catering Local 1064, 52 Lab. Arb. 781 (1969).
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individual who does not conform to the necessity for reason-
able cooperation does, in his infinitestimal rebellion, strike
a blow against the common way of life. This, then justifies
proper rules of conduct and the imposition of discipline when
infractions do occur. 39&
Arbitrator Keefe went on to describe the protestors of the new
age and how they planned to infiltrate industry to bring down the
establishment (the combined labor-management relationship). He
referred to the chaos on college campuses and said that in the indus-
trial society, society cannot allow such norms to prevail. He said
that ". . . [n]either Management nor Unions could survive if such
pandemonium became the accepted way of life."
40
It is conceivable that Arbitrator Keefe may have reinstated the
grievant if she had not insisted that she would make the same obscene
remark again under similar circumstances. This decision highlights
the tendency of arbitrators to hold that employees do indeed give
up a certain amount of personal rights when they accept employment.
Using the Collective Bargaining Agreement
It appears that arbitrators have come a long way in permitting
employees to exercise more individual rights in the area of employee
attire and hair styles, but it does not appear that they are ready to
accept common usage of obscene expressions in industry.
The use of obscene expressions will continue to be an area where
employees assert constitutional rights, but it does not appear that
they will succeed where private employers are involved. A private
employer's rights to discharge are limited only by the terms of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, by federal and state labor relations
acts or by other laws dealing with discrimination. At common law,
a contract of employment between an employer and an individual
worker is considered terminable at the will of either party if it states
no express term of employment. 41 A much broader curtailment on
management's right to discharge is found in the collective bargain-
ing agreements. The collective bargaining agreement's restriction on
an employer's right to discharge usually is a general statement that
discharge and/or discipline be for "just cause.142 However, some
writers say that even where the bargaining agreement is silent on
the matter of discipline there is an implied understanding that the
company does not have the unilateral right to discipline or discharge
an individual without such action being subject to challenge by the
union as to whether the company's action was for just cause.4 3
asa Id. at 789.
40 Id. at 790.
41 BNA LABOR RELATIONS EXPEDITOR § 19 at 155. But see, SELzNIK, LAW, SOCIETY AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 165 (Ist ed. 1969).
42 BNA LABOR RELATIONS EXPEDITOR § 19 at 155. But see, SELZNIK, LAW, SOCIETY AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE, 164-65 (lst ed. 1969).
's SEL NIK, LAw, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 165 (1st ed. 1969).
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In commenting on the employee's rights before the National
Academy of Arbitrators in 1967, Associate Justice Mathew 0. To-
briner of the California Supreme Court stated that the predicament
of the individual employee in this time of union organization is acute.
He indicated that if an employee works where a collective bargain-
ing agreement is in force, he is wholly dependent upon the union to
vindicate his rights. Furthermore, a nonunion employee, or the em-
ployee in an unorganized plant, is in an even more precarious posi-
tion. "In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement forbidding
discharge without cause, an employee may be without any remedy
despite arbitrary discipline or discharge based on unfounded or
vindictive charges or indeed upon the mere whim of management. '44
Justice Tobriner indicated that individuals attempting to exercise
constitutionally protected rights in an employment relationship will
find that due-process rights are derived from state and federal con-
stitutions to protect individuals from state action.
"Since the arbitrator decides questions raised under col-
lective bargaining contracts between employers and unions,
he does not, except in rare instances, face the question
whether the government has violated the Constitution." 44a
However, the "new" doctrines of due process (notice and hearing)
may well be analogous in arbitration proceedings.
Since the recent trend in arbitration cases has been to give more
consideration to individual rights, a logical question arises as to
just what rights the individual has in the grievance proceedings
and in the courts? As was noted earlier, an employee who works in
a plant which is not organized, may be without remedy for a dis-
charge unless he can allege that the employer violated a federal
labor, state labor or antidiscrimination statute.45
No cases were found where an employee of a private employer
was successful in getting into court to protest a discharge based on
violation of his first amendment rights. The law is fairly well settled
that in order to recover for alleged violation of first and fourteenth
amendment rights, it must be shown that the defendant's conduct
was equivalent to either state or federal action. This normally means
that an employee must be working for a government employer to
successfully pursue an argument that his constitutional rights have
been violated. One such case was mentioned earlier; however there
is no evidence that the case went beyond the Grievance Appeals Com-
mittee provided for in Rule 56 of the San Francisco Civil Service Act.46
44 Address by Associate Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner in D. JONEs, THE ARBITRATOR, THE
NLRB, AND THE COURra 39 (1967).
44a Id. at 4-1,
45 BNA LABOp RELATIONS EXPEDITOR § 19 at 155.
46 Adult Probation Dept. v. City Employees Local 400, 1 CCH 1971 Lab. Arb. Awards
§ 8037 (Dec. 2, 1970).
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In a recent New York case, a bus company's rules on personal
appearance was challenged in court by an Orthodox Muslim on the
basis of discrimination because of creed. The rule required that em-
ployees dealing with the public must be clean shaven. The complain-
ant was required by his religion to wear a beard. After being refused
employment, he filed a claim for discrimination in violation of the
New York Human Rights Law. The New York Court of Appeals held
that there was no violation of the New York Human Rights Law
where the employment decision was made pursuant to the Company's
general policy whereby it required all its employees to be clean-
shaven. The court indicated that the employment decision was not
actuated by discrimination against creed.47 Even though this case
did not involve discipline against an employee, it is interesting to
note that the "clean shaven" rule was upheld by a court against a
civil rights attack.
An employee working under a collective bargaining agreement
has a variety of avenues available to enforce his rights under the
agreement:
1. He may be able, if he meets a certain criteria, to enforce his
rights under the collective bargaining agreement by suits
brought under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.48
2. He has a right to good faith representation by his union in the
grievance procedure, and this right is enforceable both by
the courts and the National Labor Relations Board.49
The modern view that an individual employee has standing to
enforce a collective labor agreement made between the union and
his employer is usually based on the ground that the employee is a
third party beneficiary or on the ground that the contracting union
acted as the employee's agent.50
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act does not give the individual
a right to enforce the labor agreement as such, but it has been in-
terpreted that way by case law.51 However, there is considerable
authority for the principle that the employee must exhaust the griev-
ance procedure or allege that the union has violated its duty of fair
representation in processing a grievance before he will have standing
to bring a Section 301 suit.52
If a grievance procedure is provided for in the collective bar-
gaining agreement and a settlement of the grievance is reached at
47 Eastern. Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Div. of Human Rights, 27 N.Y.2d 279, 317 N.Y.S.2d
322, 266 N.E.2d 745 (1970).
48 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195 (1962); BNA, LABoR RELATIONS YEAR-
.BOOK 176 (1970).
49 BNA, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 176 (1970).
50 Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 352, 361 (1951).
51 Smith v. Evening News Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
352, 354 (1951).
52 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
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some step of the procedure, it has been held to be final and binding
on the employee. Settlements have been affirmed even when reached
between the union and company without going to arbitration and
where the employee was in disagreement with the settlement. 53
One case held that where the employer and union had the sole right
to request arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement, the
individual union members had no right to apply to the court for an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration.54
The philosophy of the Union in retaining control over
disputes and of the Company in requiring the same is sound.
A contrary procedure which would allow each individual
employee to overrule and supersede the governing body
of a Union would create a condition of disorder and instability
which would be disastrous to labor as well as industry.55
If a grievance goes to arbitration, the current case law and some
state statutes make the arbitrator's decision final, which cuts off any
avenue to the courts for the employee except for possible action to
vacate the award on grounds of fraud, undue influence or other
matters justifying equitable relief.5 6 The subject matter of the award
is not a proper basis for a subsequent civil trial, and a suit can only
be instituted upon the award itself.57
Some writers have referred to the arbitrator as resembling the
Supreme Court. 5" In his recent book, Arbitration and Labor Relations,
Clarence Updegraff said:
The courts ... have in recent opinions expressed an ex-
treme reluctance to review the merits of an arbitrator's de-
cision, and usually will refuse to overrule an award where it
contains a reasonable or plausible analysis of the provisions
of the collective agreement and is not capricious or arbitrary.
This principle, enunciated by courts on numerous occasions,
finds as its source the trilogy cases and the federal labor
policy encouraging the use of arbitration to promote the
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes.59
It appears from the current case law that employees of private
employers would not be able to get into court to argue their consti-
tutional rights in cases involving personal appearance and use of
obscene language. These arguments have been raised in the grievance
procedure and arbitration cases, but it appears the employee could
not get beyond the procedures outlined in the collective bargaining
agreement unless proceedings under the agreement involved fraud
53 Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines Inc., 437 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1970).
54 Arsenault v. General Elec. Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 413 137 A.2d 762, (1957).
55 United States v. Voges, 124 F.Supp. 543, 54647 (E.O.N.Y. 1954); citing Bianculli
v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 115 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718, 14 Misc.2d 297, 300 (1952).
56 BNA LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 132, 133 (1966); 5 AM. JUR. 2d drb. and Award
§ 146 (1962).
57 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arb. and Award § 146 (1962).
58 Address by J. P. Holacher, in BNA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING
OF NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 173 (1962).
59 C. UPDEGRLAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS 287 (3rd ed. 1970).
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or undue influence, or unless there is a violation of a state or federal
statute by the employer.
Conclusion
In summary it can be said that arbitrators are currently giving
more consideration to the employee's individual right to retain con-
trol over his own behavior in cases involving personal appearance
regulations. Arbitrators, however, are refusing to accept the use of
obscene language in industry. The employer can still set standards
regulating the employee's behavior in the area of personal appearance
as long as the standards are clear, unambiguous and consistently
enforced. The standard also must be reasonably related to the busi-
ness need of the company and it must be reasonably attuned to con-
temporary mores and attitudes toward dress and grooming. As styles
change an employer may have to change its standards.
The following survey, conducted by the author in October, 1971,
indicates that management is indeed changing its attitude toward the
personal appearance of employees. The survey covered 41 companies
in eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania ranging from small to
large in size.
It is interesting to note that 95% of those companies (37) re-
sponding to the question, "Do you have written work rules covering
these areas?", answered no. The early decisions summarized in this
paper relied heavily on written work rules in sustaining disciplinary
action involving personal appearance and wearing apparel.
The "absolutely forbidden" category stands out in that no com-
panies absolutely prohibit beards, mustaches, long sideburns, or mod
clothing.
Long Long Mod
Beards Mustaches Sideburns Hair Clothing
No objection at all ........ 34% 46% 42% 22% 27%
No objection except in
extreme cases ........... 54% 44% 44% 71% 61%
Absolutely forbidden ........ ... 2 %
Forbidden only for those who
come into contact with
the public .............. 2% .... .. .
No answer ................ 10% 10% 14% 5% 12%
A similar survey, but with different employers, was published in
the Bureau of National Affairs December 11, 1969 issue of Bulletin
to Management. The BNA survey was taken among 150 executives
from large and small companies across the nation concerning the
attitudes of their companies toward employees with beards, mus-
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss2/17
21 CLW__. ST. L. R. (2)
taches, sideburns and long hair.6 0 The results are listed below. It
should be noted that all the categories except sideburns were ab-
solutely prohibited by various percentages of the companies involved
in the survey.
Long
*Beards Mustaches Sideburns Hair
No objection at all ............. 13% 25% 25o 2%
No objection except in
extreme cases ............... 38 53 54 39
Absolutely forbidden ........... 12 3 0 18
Forbidden only for those who
come into contact with
the public ................... 9 0 2 6
No set policy, but might suggest
moderation in individual talks 27 19 19 35
*No explanation for column totaling only 99%.
Employees are not getting far with constitutional rights argu-
ments other than to influence the arbitrator's evaluation of the
reasonableness of the employer's action. If employees were able to
get into court to press their first amendment rights it is doubtful
that they would get any more support from the courts than they
are currently getting from arbitrators. It has been fairly well ac-
cepted by arbitrators that an individual gives up a certain amount
of individual rights when he enters an employer-employee relation-
ship. Similar logic was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ginsberg
V. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) where there was a question of con-
stitutional rights involving the sale of obscene literature to minors.
In that case the court held that regulations of communication ad-
dressed to children need not conform to the requirements of the
first amendment in the same way as those applicable to adults.61
From this analogy, it is conceivable that the courts would support
what appears to be the arbitrator's theory that first amendment pro-
tection need not be extended to employees on the same basis as all
other individuals.
60 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. IBEW Local 1245, 2 CCH 1970 Lab. Arb. Awards § 8808
at 5706.
e1 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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